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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the short-run and the long-run performance of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) that shipping firms have issued during the period 1997-2010 in 
major Stock Exchanges. The sample is underpriced at 31.74% on the first listing day. 
The underpricing is strongly positively related to the market size of the company at a 
1% level of significance. In the long-run, the sample was found to be positively 
related to the proportion of equity offered at the first trading day at a 10% level of 
significance. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) indicate that shipping firms 
underperform after 1, 2 and 3 years, while both Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns and 
Wealth Relatives show that there is an overperformance in all time periods under 
examination.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to detect two anomalies of the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), the 
short-run underpricing and the long-run underperformance. The first objective of this 
project is to test the factors that affect the underpricing of the Shipping IPOs. The data 
were retrieved for the period 1997-2010. The sample consists of 63 IPOs that have 14 
different countries of domicile and are listed in 10 different Stock Exchanges.   
The factors evaluated in order to investigate their impact on shipping IPO stock 
market performance are: 
 The gross proceeds of the IPO issue 
 The size of the company 
 The proportion of equity offered 
 The gearing level 
 The age of the company 
 The age of the fleet 
 The reputation of the underwriter  
 The reputation of the Stock Exchange 
 The initial underpricing (is used only in the examination of the long-run 
performance).  
 
The second objective of this project is to test the long-run performance of the IPOs in 
the first, second and third year after their listing. For the purposes of the study, the 
measures of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR), Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
(BHAR) and Wealth Relative will be used as to evaluate the long-run performance. 
The next step is to investigate how the long-run performance is affected by some 
institutional factors. The benchmark used for each country’s IPO is the corresponding 
index in which the listing took place.  
We extract the majority of the data from the prospectuses and the financial reports of 
the listed companies that have issued IPOs during the period under examination. The  
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data will be analyzed using mainly econometric models with the support of the 
statistical package EViews and MS office products.  
The main reasons that the period of 1997-2010 has been chosen for analysis are the 
growth that the shipping industry presented during this period and the fact that there is 
inadequate literature for shipping IPOs during this specific period. Shipping is a sector 
that is unique because of its particular characteristics, such as the market size of a 
shipping company, which is directly related to the company’s assets (vessels), and the 
cyclical nature of the business. During the dot-com crisis, when the shipping rates 
were ranging at a very high level, researchers observed a wave of shipping IPO push. 
Another wave has recently been observed, during the period just before the credit 
crisis (2007-2010). Shipping companies were entering the IPO market in order to 
finance vessel acquisitions and vessels that would be delivered to them within the 
period of the credit crunch. The purpose of this paper is to present evidence about the 
shipping sector shares, such as their movement and their progress over a period of 
time. Despite the fact that we use techniques which have already been tested, we 
examine the effect various factors have on the short-run and long-run performance of 
shipping stocks by implementing new combinations using these factors in the 
regression models. The initial underpricing is a factor that its effect on the long-run 
performance of the shipping IPOs has not been examined so far to the best of our 
knowledge. We examine the relationship between the underpricing on the first listing 
day and the long run performance of the shipping IPO.  
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature about IPO underpricing, IPO underpricing in the shipping sector 
specifically and the long-run performance. The data, the sources from which they 
were retrieved and the factors that are used in the regression models, are described in 
section 3. In section 4 the methodology used both in short-run and long-run 
performance examination is analyzed. The short-run and long-run performance results 
are included in section 5. Finally, in section 6 the conclusion of the research is 
presented. 
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2. Literature Overview 
 
2.1 IPO Underpricing 
Initial Public Offering is a company’s first listing in the Stock Exchange. This price is 
not affected from the Laws of Supply and Demand, but is agreed by both the company 
and the Investment Bank during the underwriting process, and finally approved from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The company has to collect a great 
deal of information to be considered and all its financial records have to be audited, in 
order to end up with a prospectus that totally complies with SEC and Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002 regulations. 
 A company chooses to issue new stocks mainly because it wants to raise capital in 
order to expand its businesses, finance research and development or even pay off its 
debt. Except from creating liquidity, the company also increases its publicity, 
becomes known to a new group of potential consumers, revive its image and has the 
ability to receive better lending terms as the debt to equity ratio improves when the 
company goes public. On the other hand, the issuance of stocks also means expenses, 
some of which is the payment of the Advisory council, and the filing and listing fees. 
An additional cost that has to be considered is the Opportunity Cost of the corporate 
resources that is high due to the fact that the preparation of the offering is a lengthy 
process.  
The method used to evaluate the companies that are about to be listed varies from 
sector to sector. Common methods used are the Discounted Free Cash Flow (DCF) 
and the Residual Income Model (RIM), however, Comparable Multiples is the most 
frequently used method by investment banks. In Comparable Multiples method the 
evaluation takes place by comparing measures of the company with the same 
measures of companies that share the same basic characteristics with the company 
under consideration and are already listed in the Stock Exchange. Such measures 
could be the price to earnings ratio (P/E), the EV/EBITDA ratio, the market to book 
equity ratio (M/B) and any other ratios that could lead the analyst to safe results about 
the company. 
The time that the company chooses to enter the Stock Market, initially depends on 
two very important variables. The first variable is the company’s level of development 
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and the second is the market conditions at the time, however the preparation starts 
months before the issuing of the stocks. 
An IPO is a crucial decision for the company. There are several theories that attempt 
to explain why companies decide to go public. One theory supports that the issuing of 
an IPO gives the firm the opportunity to minimize the cost of capital, in order to 
achieve the optimal capital structure (Scott, 1976; M&M, 1963). One other theory 
supports that the creation of a public market, give the firms the currency of shares for 
acquisitions (Brau, Francis, and Kohers, 2003). Moreover, Maksimovic and Pichler  
(2001) support that many companies enter the IPO market to increase their publicity 
and their reputation. Additionally, going public allows more dispersion of ownership 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999),and according to Zingales (1995) and Mello and 
Parsons (2000) the IPO offers the opportunity to a company to establish a market 
value, which will be different from its book value derived from the financial 
statements. 
 
By studying the IPOs prospectuses, we come to the conclusion that shipping 
companies enter the IPO market for several reasons. According to the prospectuses, 
all shipping companies raise capital in order to acquire extra vessels, to repay their 
debt or for other corporate purposes that are not specified in more details. Moreover, 
shipping companies issue equity in order to finance general working capital purposes 
and the expansion of their activities. The examination of the sample lead us to the 
result that most of the companies need liquidity in order to finance more than one 
activities at once, for example either vessel acquisition and debt repayment, or debt 
repayment and general corporate purposes. According to the sample, the basic reasons 
for a shipping company to go public are to raise capital, through stock issue, in order 
to acquire vessels and repay its debt at a proportion of 57% and 51% respectively. 
Other reasons include the need for liquidity for general corporate purposes at a 
proportion of 33% and to finance general working capital purposes using net proceeds 
at a proportion of 29%. 
Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) examined in their study the reasons why the 
shipping companies enter the IPO markets and they concluded that the first reason 
was vessel acquisition, the second was the asset play role, the third the debt 
repayment and the final one other trading activities. 
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It is obvious that the basic reason behind the listing, despite the passage of time, is 
vessel acquisition. The purpose of the asset play is not among the reasons of going 
public for the companies of our sample or there is no reference in the companies’ IPO 
prospectuses concerning this activity. On the other hand, we can observe that shipping 
companies use the proceeds of the stock issuing for different reasons than the previous 
study of Grammenos and Marcoulis such as general corporate purposes. It is possible 
though, that shipping companies are placing the asset play in general corporate 
purposes. 
One of the most frequent irregularities that is observed in new markets for an IPO is 
the underpricing. Many researches and studies have been conducted in order to 
explain the underpricing and the factors that may cause it. The underpricing occurs 
when the offer price of a share is lower than the close price. This difference between 
the offer price of a stock and its closing price on the first trading day concerns mainly 
the issuer. The closing price of the stock represents the real price of the stock in the 
market, but in the case of IPOs the issuer does not benefit from the closing price but 
the offer price instead, when there is the phenomenon of the underpricing, the issuer 
obtains less than the possible raised capital (Daily, Certo, Dalton and Roengpitya, 
2003; Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter, 1988). When underpricing occurs the wealth is 
being transferred from the founders of the firm to new investors (Filatotchev and 
Bishop, 2002). IPOs exhibit underpricing due to the information asymmetry between 
the issuers and the investors. Baron’s (1982) principal-agent model supposes that the 
underwriter know more about capital market conditions and potential investors than 
the IPO issuer does. Underpricing is based on models which assume that the issuer is 
better informed about firm value than external investors are (Allen and Faulhaber, 
1989). On the other hand, according to Rock (1986) and to Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989), adverse selection and “book-building” models assume that IPO investors have 
better information than the issuer about market conditions and demand for IPO shares. 
Many studies on IPOs, such as the studies of Reilley and Hatfield (1969), Brown 
(1970), Stoll and Curley (1970), Block and Stanley (1980) and Neuberger and 
LaChapelle (1983) were principally concerned with testing the likely profit for 
investors in these issues. The results of all the above studies specify that on average, 
IPOs offered positive surplus returns in the short run, and it is widely accepted that 
this was due to the underpricing of these new issues by the underwriters.  
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 Additionally, IPO companies use underpricing in order to have more concentrated 
owners (Stoughton and Zechner, 1998). At this point, it has to be mentioned that most 
literature until the end of 1990s supports the notion that underpricing is explained 
from the existence of information asymmetry (Ritter and Welch, 2002). In the same 
research they also reveal that underpricing is a very common phenomenon over the 
last few years and mainly in the period of dot-com crisis, especially in US. It is 
essential to indicate that there are no shipping IPOs in our sample that have been 
issued during the dot-com crisis. Ritter and Welch (2002) found that the returns in the 
first listing day were 7.4% on average in the 1980s and increased to 11.2% and 18.1% 
in the early 1990s and the mid-1990s, respectively. During the dot-com crisis the 
average return on the first listing day was 65%. More recent literature stated that 
conflicts of interests and agency problems are responsible for the underpricing 
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003).  
 
2.2 Shipping IPO Underpricing 
Shipping is a developing sector of the world economy. During the 80s and 90s most 
shipping companies were family-owned businesses and there was a limited number of 
listed shipping firms. From 2000 to 2010 the number of shipping companies listed 
increased dramatically. London’s Stock Exchange was the main market with shipping 
stocks in the 1980s; later in the 1990s Oslo Stock Exchange and New York Stock 
Exchange were getting a bigger share of the shipping market. Today with leader stock 
markets in shipping stocks being the NYSE and NASDAQ, the shipping sector 
penetrates in markets all over the world. 
The market value of a shipping company is often closely associated to the underlying 
value of the physical assets (vessels) (Syriopoulos, 2007).  We have to take under 
consideration, that during the underwriting of a shipping company, one basic factor 
that affects the decision of the price is the assets of the company, thus, the fleet of the 
company. The companies under examination have a fleet that in most cases is 
composed of one or two types of vessels. According to the sample most shipping 
companies use either dry bulk carriers or tankers. Dry bulk carriers are vessels that 
carry homogenous, non-liquid, unpackaged cargo, “that can be poured, tipped or 
pumped into the holds or tanks of the ship” (Grammenos, 2002), such as, cement, coal 
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or grain. On the other hand, tankers are vessels, exclusively designed to carry liquid 
cargo, such as, oil, chemicals, wine, food oils, etc. The sample also contains 
companies that own containerships. Containerships are vessels that carry their cargo 
into containers and can be easily loaded and unloaded. 
Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) have examined the underpricing in a cross country 
analysis. Their sample consists of 31 shipping IPOs from seven different countries: 
Hong Kong, Singapore, USA, Sweden, Norway, Greece and Luxemburg. The IPOs 
were issued during the period 1983 to 1995 and the characteristics that were examined 
are the gross proceeds of the IPO issue, the size of the company, the proportion of 
equity offered, the gearing level, the age of the company and the age of the fleet. The 
data required for their research, were retrieved from the IPO prospectuses of the listed 
companies. Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) concluded that the main reason for a 
shipping company to raise capital through the issuing of the IPOs is the acquisition of 
the vessels and secondary reasons are the asset play and the debt repayment. 
Additionally, they found out that the shipping IPOs tend to increase over time and so 
does the size of the shipping companies that enter the IPOs market. The proportion of 
equity offered through the IPOs was on average 98% from US companies, 29% from 
Hong Kong companies, 25% from Greek companies, while in Sweden, Norway and 
the remainder of the US companies the equity offered was between 42% and 48%. 
The findings about the average age of fleets show that the age is increasing over time. 
Moreover, the Stock Exchanges are attracting on average more newly established 
companies, or companies that have been created through mergers or acquisitions of 
older companies. Grammenos and Marcoulis study indicates that the underpricing 
(5.32%) is of small magnitude but is statistically significant. 
Finally, the most significant finding of their study is that gearing is positively related 
to underpricing and was the only factor found to have explanatory power over cross-
sectional underpricing of the whole sample. Furthermore, gearing and the proportion 
of equity offered were found to be positively related to cross-sectional underpricing as 
far as the sample is concerned to be free from the shipping funds. 
Merikas, Gounopoulos and Nounis (2009) in their paper “Global Shipping IPOs 
Performance”, examined 143 Global Shipping IPOs of companies that were listed 
during the period 1984-2007. This paper, among other subjects that analyzes, also 
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tests how some factors affect the underpricing of the shipping IPOs. The 
characteristics examined, were the age of the issuing firm, the market in which the 
Shipping IPOs were listed, the underwriter’s reputation, the size of the company, the 
period of listing and the reputation of the Stock Exchange.  
In order to examine the significance level of these determinants on their sample, they 
constructed a regression model to enhance the multivariate regression. The model, 
they came up with is: 
Pt = a + β1 Log(1+AGE) + β2 (MRK) + β3 (UND) + β4 Log(SIZE) + β5 (H/C) + β6 
(EXC) + εi 
Where AGE, is the age of the issuing firm is in operation since its constitution before 
the year of listing, MRK is the market where Shipping IPOs have been classified. 
UND is the Underwriters’ reputation. SIZE is the logarithm of the market 
capitalization of an IPO, H/C describes the period of listing and finally EXC is the 
reputation of the stock exchange in which the issuing took place. The cross sectional 
regressions indicated that the Age is a statistically significant variable and the 
conclusion was that the “younger” firms were facing greater underpricing than the 
“older” firms. For the second determinant examined, and that was the Market that the 
IPO was listed, they found that the statistical result was insignificant, though, they 
concluded that the New Market IPOs perform better over a three years period and the 
Main Market IPOs yield better returns. Shipping firms listed with non reputable 
underwriters experienced severe level of underpricing (Merikas et. al. 2009). At the 
same study, the results of the research showed that the size of the company doesn’t 
affect the underpricing, thus, there isn’t evidence that bigger offers lead to a smaller 
amount of underpricing. Levis (1993) has also derived the same results. But, it’s 
necessary to take into account that a country’s valuations of firms and size of capital 
markets are directly attributable to the degree at which entrepreneurs receive better 
terms, (Moore, Bell and Filatotchev, 2010). Thus, there is a strong relationship 
between the size of the company and the Stock Market that Shipping Companies 
chose to issue their IPO. 
 
The Cold Market IPOs have lower initial returns from the Hot Market IPOs, since 
investor’s interest is low, but, in a Hot Market, in a six month period, returns are 
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decreasing because of the investor’s realization that the stock is overvalued (Merikas 
et. al., 2009). The same study showed that when IPOs are issued in the main Global 
Markets, they experience greater level of underpricing than the IPOs that are issued in 
Secondary Markets. Thus, IPOs in the main Global Markets don’t only have greater 
initial returns, but also in the long term. 
Credit ratings are also playing a crucial role in the Shipping IPO pricing. Heng An 
and Kam C. Chan (2008), examined a sample of U.S. common share IPOS that were 
issued during the period 1986-2004, and found that the companies that have credit 
ratings when they go public experience significantly less underpricing than the 
companies that don’t have credit ratings, and this because the existence of the credit 
ratings decreases the information asymmetry.  
 
2.3 Long-Run Performance 
 
For the purposes of the study, we calculate the long-run returns on a monthly basis in 
order to detect if there is underperformance or overperformance in the long-term. 
Underperformance occurs when the long-run return of the shipping company has a 
lower performance than the benchmark. Overperformance occurs when the long-run 
return of the shipping company has a higher performance than the benchmark’s, on 
the same period. 
Using the data after the formation of the IPO, analysts have closely examined the IPO 
performance over time. The long-run performance of the IPOs is a very interesting 
subject in a number of ways. From the investors’ aspect, the comprehension of the 
IPO performance is a way to create arbitrage opportunities. From the issuers’ aspect, 
the performance results of IPOs that belong to the same sector is a way to evaluate the 
perspective of their listing or even use it as a decision tool for the company’s entrance 
in the IPO market. 
Shiller (1990) supports the theory that issuers underprice the IPOs in order to attract 
investors. Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) found that their sample was underperformed 
after a 3year period. Ritter (1991) concludes that possible explanations for the IPO 
underperformance are the risk mismeasurement, bad luck or fads and overoptimism. 
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Using a sample that consisted of 1,526 U.S. IPOs that went public during the period 
1975-84, Ritter (1991) found that three years after the issuing , “the firms were 
significantly underperformed (by about -34.47%) using a set of comparable firms 
matched by size and industry” by using Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and the 
Wealth Relative factor (WR). Levis (1993) examined 712 IPOs that were listed on the 
London Stock Exchange during the period 1980-88 and found that the long-run 
underperformance is not a phenomenon unique to U.S. IPOs. Additionally found that 
the long-run underperformance extends beyond the three years and that the firms with 
the highest initial returns have the tendency to have the worst aftermarket 
performance. Loughran and Ritter (1995) concluded that the stocks issued during the 
period 1970-90 have been poor long-run investments for investors. Moreover, 
investors after five years received average returns of only 5% per year, moreover, they 
found evidence that underperformance is the product of the utilization of “windows of 
opportunity” by the issuer and the underwriter. Cai et. al. (1997) investigated the 
long-run performance of 180 IPOs that were listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
during the period 1971-92 and concluded that “the post-issue deterioration in 
operating performance cannot be attributed to the reduced managerial ownership”. 
Hong Teoh et. al. (1998), through their paper provide evidence that IPOs with 
unusually high accruals in the first year of issuing, experience poor stock return 
performance after three years. They showed as well, that “IPO issuers in the most 
“aggressive” quartile of earnings have a three-year aftermarket stock return of 
approximately 20% than IPO issuers in the most “conservative” quartile”. Gompers 
and Lerner (2001) examined the underperformance of 3,661 U.S. IPOs that were 
issued during the period 1935-72 using both Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Buy-
and-Hold Abnormal Returns. The findings showed that the underperformance 
disappears when CARs are used, but there is some evidence of underperformance 
when BHRAs are used. Merikas et. al. (2009) analyzed the long-run performance of 
143 Global shipping IPOs listed during the period 1984-2007 in major Stock 
Exchanges. They concluded that an investor who buys immediately after listing and 
holds the shares for three years will make a loss of 15.72%, Merikas et. al. (2009) 
used both BHARs and CARs in their research.  
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3. Data 
 
The Shipping IPO sample is constructed using the information given in each 
company’s IPO prospectus. The sample consists of 63 shipping companies that were 
listed during the period 1997-2010, from USA, Norway, Greece, United Kingdom, 
Singapore, Bermuda, China, Netherlands, Switzerland, Monaco, Malaysia, Korea, 
Ireland and Bahamas. The companies under examination are listed in Stock 
Exchanges around the world, such as New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, Oslo 
Bors, Singapore Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Euronext Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Bursa Malaysia, Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
and Berlin Stock Exchange. In Table 3.1 there is a report of the sample in detail.  
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE IN TERMS OF THE MARKET 
Stock 
Exchange1 
Nasdaq NYSE OSE SGX LSE FWB OTC BER KLSE HKEX 
Number 
of IPOs 
17 25 7 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 
                                                                      Table 3.1 
 
We retrieved the requisite information for the IPO sample from Bloomberg database, 
Thomson one, Perfect Filings, SEC Filings and other well-known financial sources 
such as Yahoo Finance . Additionally, the official sites of some shipping companies 
proved to be useful in some cases. However, it is difficult to extract information about 
the prospectuses of some European shipping companies. In order to find the necessary 
data for these maritime firms, there was direct communication with the authorized 
personnel which in some cases it proved to be very useful. 
The data that we collected from each prospectus were the date of issue, the Market of 
listing, the country of domicile, the number of shares offered, the offer price, the 
purpose that the company had issued the shares, the underwriting discount per share, 
the average age of the fleet at issuing date, the type of the fleet and the underwriter of 
                                                             
1
 NYSE: New York Stock Exchange, OSE: Oslo Stock Exchange, SGX: Singapore Stock Exchange, LSE: 
London Stock Exchange, FWB: Frankfurt Stock Exchange, OTC: Over the Counter, BER: Berlin Stock 
Exchange, KLSE: Malaysia Stock Exchange, HKEX: Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
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the IPO. We also retrieved the company’s year of foundation from the official sites, in 
order to be aware of each company’s age. The companies’ and indices’ historical 
prices were extracted from Bloomberg database and we used the last Financial 
Statements before the issuing to extract the Total Debt and the Total Assets for each 
company. The historical risk free rates and betas were also extracted from Bloomberg. 
 
3.1 Shipping IPOs Underpricing Factors  
 
3.1.1 Gross proceeds 
One factor that its effect on IPO performance is examined, is the gross proceeds of the 
shipping firm. We calculated the gross proceeds of the companies as the number of 
IPO shares multiplied by the offer price. The average gross proceeds of the sample is 
$524,735,605. If we examine carefully, the companies’ gross proceeds according to 
the country of domicile we can observe that United Kingdom has the highest average 
($1,928,719,993). On the other hand, the shipping company of Netherlands Fairmount 
Heavy Transport N.V which is listed in Oslo Stock Exchange has the lowest amount 
of gross proceeds ($52,800,000). The average gross proceeds of the Greek shipping 
companies is close to but higher than the average of the sample ($670,378,643). The 
average of the companies of Hong Kong is almost equal with the average of the 
sample. Finally, the rest of the countries of domicile, US, Norway, Bermuda, 
Singapore, Bahamas, Korea and at last Malaysia have shipping companies with lower 
average than the sample’s. One can observe that in 2006 the IPOs with the highest 
average gross proceeds ($1,466,235,839) were listed, while in 2001 and 2002 the 
IPOs with the lowest average $62,680,000 and $95,250,000 were listed, respectively. 
In 2004, 2005 and 2007 IPOs with an average almost $400,000,000 were listed. In 
years 1997, 2008 and 2010 one can observe that the IPOs have an average very close 
to $200,000,000. Figure 3.1.1 shows that 2006 was the year with the highest gross 
proceeds.      
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         GROSS PROCEEDS IN TERMS OF THE ISSUING YEAR 
 
                                                                  Figure 3.1.1 
3.1.2 Size of the company 
The sample gives a clear view of the size that companies have at issuing date. The 
sample has an average size $824,166,166. The shipping companies that have United 
Kingdom as country of domicile, exhibit the highest average size which is 
$5,692,868,947, Greek shipping companies are next with average size $917,640,430, 
Norwegian and Chinese shipping companies are following with an average size 
$464,181,482 and $401,243,133, respectively. We calculate that shipping companies 
from United Kingdom have the largest proportion of size in the sample which is 
43.85%, Greek shipping companies own the 35.34% of the total size of the sample. 
Finally, Norwegian and U.S. shipping companies own the 5.36% and 3.17%, 
respectively. If the size of the companies is analyzed through the passage of time, it is 
noted that in 2004 was the beginning of a significant increase in the size of the 
shipping companies entering the IPO Market, with average size of the year the 
$306,898,100 while in 2002 the average size was only $30,480,000. The peak of this 
increase is observed in 2007 that the average size reaches the $1,668,448,982 
although in 2008 there is a big fall and the average size of the shipping companies 
entering the IPO Market is $175,930,000 (Figure 3.1.2). 
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SIZE IN TERMS OF THE ISSUING YEAR 
 
                                                                   Figure 3.1.2 
 
3.1.3 Proportion of Equity offered 
Another factor, whose influence on underpricing of shipping IPOs will be examined, 
is the proportion of equity offered. At this point it is essential to underline that the 
most stock exchanges have requirements about the number of stocks that are publicly 
held or a minimum amount of capital that must be in public hands. In order to get 
listed in NASDAQ Stock Exchange a company has to have at least 1,250,000 publicly 
held shares outstanding or the market value of these stocks must be at least 45 million 
US $. In the case of NYSE the requirements are quite different, there must be at least 
1,100,000 publicly held shares outstanding or 2,000 shareholders must have on their 
property rights 100 or more shares, alternatively the market value of publicly held 
shares must be between a minimum of 9 million US $ and a maximum of 40 million 
$, depending on the market conditions. At the Stock Exchange of Oslo the 
requirements are different than those of the U.S. Stock Exchanges. The first 
requirement is that a minimum of 25% of the total shares must be publicly held. The 
second one is that the market value of shares must be 30 million NOK and in the case 
the equity certification must be at least 8 million NOK. The last requirement, which is 
qualitative, is that the company must exist at least 3 years. In Malaysia Stock 
Exchange at least 25% of the Company's share capital must be publicly held and a 
0
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minimum of 1.000 public shareholders must hold not less than 100 shares each. In 
Hong Kong and in Singapore a minimum of 25% of the total shares must be publicly 
held. Moreover the same requirement exists in the German Stock Exchanges of Berlin 
and Frankfurt. Finally the London Stock Exchange has no requirement for listings. 
In the sample the maximum amount of stocks that one shipping firm offers is 
1,400,000,000 and this company is Sinotrans Shipping which is listed in the Stock 
Exchange of Frankfurt, while the minimum amount that is offered is 2,700,000 stocks 
for both Nordic American Tankers and Trailer Bridge Inc. The average equity offered 
from the companies that are listed in NYSE is 9,680,583 stocks while the minimum is 
2,700,000 stocks and the maximum is 28,570,000 stocks of Nordic American Tankers 
and Seaspan Corporation, respectively. The firms that are listed in NASDAQ have an 
average equity offered 11,585,149 stocks, while the minimum is 2,700,000 stocks that 
is the equity offered from Trailer Bridge Inc., while the maximum is 22,000,000 
stocks offered by Seanergy Maritime Corporation. In Oslo Stock Exchange the 
company with the minimum equity offered, is Awilco ASA with 3,000,000 stocks 
while the company with the maximum is Camillo Eitzen with 420,000,000 stocks, 
finally the average shares of the listed shipping companies in Oslo Stock Exchange is 
105,466,308 stocks. Furthermore, in Singapore Stock Exchange the company with the 
minimum quantity of stocks is First Ship Lease Trust with 220,000,000 stocks and the 
company with the maximum is Rickmers Maritime with 274,350,000 stocks 
outstanding while the average is 258,635,281 stocks. In London Stock Exchange the 
minimum offering of equity is 8,423,333 shares and the maximum is 25,531,915 
shares, the offering of Globus Maritime Carriers and the offering of Golden Port 
Holdings, respectively. Additionally, the average proportion is 15,923,156 stocks. In 
the Stock Exchange of Berlin there is only the US Shipping Partners with 6,000,000 
stocks outstanding and in Frankfurt we have two companies, STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd 
with 600,000,000 stocks and Sinotrans Shipping with 1,400,000,000 shares 
outstanding. Moreover, in Malaysia we have the Shin Yang Shipping Corporation 
BERHAD with 305,186,000 shares. We can observe that shipping companies with a 
high number of shares outstanding have very low initial prices. Figure 3.1.3 shows 
that there is low volatility proportionally to the equity offered from the shipping 
companies, after 2008 though, there is a steady and strong increase. 
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  PROPORTION OF EQUITY IN TERMS OF THE ISSUING YEAR 
 
 
                                                                   Figure 3.1.3 
 
3.1.4 Gearing level 
A very important factor to be examined is the gearing level of each company. We will 
examine if the gearing level affects the underpricing of an IPO. The gearing level is 
estimated as the total debt to total assets expressed as a ratio. The average gearing of 
the shipping companies of the sample is 0.54. If each country is investigated 
individually, the average gearing level of the Greek companies is 0.51, almost the 
same with the average of the sample, while the average gearing for US shipping 
companies is 0.54 which is exactly the same with the average of the sample. The 
average for UK shipping companies is 0.56, slightly higher than the average of the 
sample. The Norwegian companies have an average gearing ratio of 0.52. Companies 
whose domicile countries are Netherlands and Monaco have a gearing level of about 
0.37 and 0.39, respectively. Moreover, the average gearing for shipping companies of 
Bermuda is 0.51 very close to the average of the sample. In Asian countries, maritime 
firms based in Singapore have an average of 0.39. The Korean shipping company has 
an average of 0.58 and the Malaysian shipping company has a gearing ratio of 0.18 
which is the lowest of our sample. Hong Kong firms have an average of about 0.52. 
The shipping company with the highest gearing ratio (1.42) is Ultrapetrol Limited. 
There are in total 3 out of 63 shipping companies with no long term debt at the time of 
entering the IPO Market. Figure 3.1.4 shows the gearing level of the shipping 
company during the issuing.  
X100 (%) 
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             GEARING LEVEL IN TERMS OF THE ISSUING YEAR 
 
                                                                Figure 3.1.4 
                                                              
3.1.5 The age of the company 
We examine if the age of the company at the time of the issuing is a factor that 
influences the shipping IPO underpricing. The vast majority of the shipping 
companies in our sample, is newly established companies and have 1-15 years of 
operation before the issuing date. The average age of the shipping companies is 16.43 
years. At this point it is essential to mention that if we exclude from the sample four 
companies whose age is close to a hundred, we conclude that the 93.65% of the 
shipping companies have average age 9.72 years. The 46% of the sample are shipping 
companies that entered the IPO Market during their first or their second year of 
operation. 
 
3.1.6 The age of the fleet 
One other factor, whose effect on the underpricing of IPOs is going to be tested, is the 
age of the fleet. At this point it is underlined that the sample is separated into dry bulk 
sector, containership sector and tanker sector. 
The average age of fleet of the sample is 11.1 years. The average age of the dry bulk 
companies’ fleet is equal to 11 years, while the average age of fleet for tanker 
companies is 10.7. The average age of the containerships is 7.8 years; we have to 
underline the fact that in our sample we have to test only 5 container companies, of 
which we only have information for the 3 of them concerning the age of their fleet. 
The shipping company with the oldest fleet is Trailer Bridge Inc. with average age of 
X100 (%) 
 
22 
fleet 27.9 years and Horizon Lines with the youngest fleet, with average age of fleet 
0.75 years. 
Moreover, in a cross-country analysis, we can see the country with the youngest fleet 
is Singapore with an average of 2 years. Bermuda and Netherlands have an average 
age of fleet of 6 years and Hong Kong has an average of 6.1 years which is very close 
to Monaco with an average of 6.6 years. Greek companies have an average of 10.7 
years, very close to the sample’s average, Norway with an average of 12.3 years and 
UK and Malaysia with an average of 13.6 and 13.95 years, respectively. Finally, US 
shipping companies have the highest average of 14.2 years. 
 
3.1.7 The reputation of the underwriter 
This part will examine whether the underwriters’ reputation has any effect on the 
prices of the IPOs or not. In the sample 26 IPOs out of 61 have the appropriate 
information available and have non famous underwriters and the remaining 35 have 
famous. At the top is Singapore, in which all shipping companies of the sample have 
reputable underwriters. In US 80% of the companies and 87.5% in Bermuda have 
famous underwriters. Then, there are the shipping companies of Hong Kong with a 
percentage of 67% and UK with a percentage of 60%. We can see that the countries 
with the lowest percentages are Greece with 44% and Norway with 17%. Finally, we 
come to the conclusion that in Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands and Monaco the shipping 
companies of the sample do not have reputable underwriters. 
 
3.1.8 The reputation of the Stock Exchange 
Moreover, we examine the extent at which the reputation of the Stock Exchanges 
affects the underpricing of the IPOs. In the sample, 73% of the shipping companies 
are listed in famous stock exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, and London). The rest of the 
companies are listed in unreputable Stock Exchanges such as Singapore, Malaysia, 
Berlin, Frankfurt, Oslo and Hong Kong. 
All Greek shipping companies of the sample are listed in reputable stock exchanges, 
specifically, 18 out of 20 are listed in the U.S. markets and the remaining 2 in London 
Stock Exchange. All the U.S. shipping companies are listed in U.S. markets except 
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from one which is listed in the Berlin Stock Exchange. The same results are derived 
for the shipping companies which are based in Bermuda and in the UK, only 1 out of 
9 is listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange and 1 out of 6 is listed in OTC market. The 
Norwegian shipping companies are listed in Oslo market. The Hong Kong shipping 
companies are listed in non reputable markets except from one company. The 
shipping companies of Malaysia and Singapore are listed in the local markets. Finally, 
the shipping company of Korea is listed in Frankfurt market. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Short-Run Performance Regression 
For the purpose of the study, the regression analysis statistical tool is used, in order to 
investigate the relationships between the variables. In the first part of investigation in 
the study, cross sectional regression analyses are undertaken to determine the effect of 
the independent variables on the dependent variable. In this case, the dependent 
variable is the continuously compounded returns of the IPO, since the aim is to 
examine the effect the independent variables have on underpricing. The independent 
variables are the gross proceeds of the IPO issue, the size of the company, the 
proportion of equity offered, the gearing level, the age of the company, the age of the 
fleet, the reputation of the underwriter, and the reputation of the Stock Exchange. The 
IPO underpricing is an effect that takes place in every Market round the world and in 
every sector. Although it is a widespread effect, very little work has been carried out 
on the performance of IPOs in shipping sector. According to Syriopoulos (2007), 
shipping companies that offer more equity to the public, experience higher 
underpricing than those offering less equity. The models predict that underpricing is 
more severe in the case of smaller issue sizes, Ranjan (2004). Shipping companies 
that entered the Market during the hot period experience more underpricing, than the 
companies listed during the cold period. Furthermore, young shipping companies 
exhibit higher underpricing than those that have a long operation history before the 
issuing, Merikas et. al. (2009).  
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A regression model has been constructed for this purpose that will be modified 
according to the circumstances: 
R = a + b1(GP) + b2[log(SZ)] + b3(EO) + b4(D/A) + b5[log(1+age01)] +    
+b6[log(1+age02)] + b7(RU) + b8(RSE) + εi   
Where R are the returns, GP are the gross proceeds, SZ is the size of the company, EO 
is the proportion of equity offered, D/A is the gearing level, age01 is the age of the 
company, age02 is the average age of the fleet, RU is the reputation of the 
underwriter, and RSE is the reputation of the Stock Exchange. 
The gross proceeds of the IPO issue are calculated by the number of issued shares 
times the offer price. The size of the company is the number of the issued shares times 
the close price at the first trading day. The proportion of equity offered is the number 
of shares that are issued related to the company’s total equity. The gearing level is 
determined as the total debt that the company had before the issuing divided by the 
total assets before the issuing. The age of the company are the years of company’s 
operation, from its day of foundation till the issuing date. The age of the fleet is the 
average age of all company’s vessels at the issuing date. The reputation of the 
underwriter is a qualitative factor and not a quantitative and as a result a dummy 
variable is used in order to examine it. We recognize as reputable underwriters the 
following: Citigroup, Goldman and Sachs, J.P Morgan, Merrill Lynch, UBS, Bank of 
America Securities LLC and Lehman Brothers. The reputable underwriters are 
represented from the number “1”, and the non reputable underwrites, which are all the 
underwriters except the reputable, are represented from the number “0”. The 
reputation of the Stock Exchange as it is also a qualitative factor is treated in the same 
way as the reputation of the underwriters. This time the reputable Stock Exchanges 
are: NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE and are represented from the number “1”, and the non 
reputable are all the Stock Exchanges except the reputable and are represented from 
the number “0”. 
4.2 Long-Run Performance Measures 
The long-run performance is examined in a sample that consists of 51 shipping IPOs 
issued during the period 1997-2008. A reduced sample is used, because the initial 
consisted of IPOs that were issued in year 2010 and it is not possible to examine their 
long-run performance. The long-run performance is analyzed on a monthly basis and 
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we measure the performance of 51 shipping IPOs for one and two year periods and 42 
shipping IPOs for a three year period, the sample is decreased due to the fact that 
some IPOs were issued during the year 2008.  Table (4.1.1) shows a distribution of 
the sample in terms of the market that the issuing took place in. For the long-run 
performance analysis, we use monthly returns of the stocks, the time periods 
examined are 12, 24 and 36 months. The measures that are used are: cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR), buy-and-hold returns (BHR) and wealth relatives (WR). 
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) argue that the BHAR 
represents a better method than CAR. In addition, Lougran and Ritter (2000) 
demonstrate that a BHAR relative to a benchmark portfolio is superior to the Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model when estimating post-IPO performance. The 
next step is to investigate how some institutional factors affect the long-run 
performance by running cross sectional regressions. The factors that will be examined 
are the same that were used in order to examine their effect on underpricing, i.e. the 
gross proceeds of the IPO issue, the size of the company, the proportion of equity 
offered, the gearing level, the age of the company, the age of the fleet, the reputation 
of the underwriter and the reputation of the Stock Exchange. For the purpose of this 
regression, an extra explanatory factor is used; we have used initial underpricing as a 
determinant of the long run performance. This factor is introduced in the regression 
model as a dummy variable. The value (1) corresponds to the shipping IPOs that 
exhibited underpricing in the short-run and the value (0) to those that did not. A 
regression model has been constructed for this purpose that will be modified 
according to the circumstances: 
BHAR = a + b1(GP) + b2[log(SZ)] + b3(EO) + b4(D/A) + b5[log(1+age01)] +    
+b6[log(1+age02)] + b7(RU) + b8(RSE) + b9(IU) + εi   
Where BHAR are Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns, GP are the gross proceeds, SZ is 
the size of the company, EO is the proportion of equity offered, D/A is the gearing 
level, age01 is the age of the company, age02 is the average age of the fleet, RU is the 
reputation of the underwriter, RSE is the reputation of the Stock Exchange and IU is 
the initial underpricing. 
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE REDUCED SAMPLE IN TERMS OF THE 
MARKET 
Stock 
Exchange2 
Nasdaq NYSE OSE SGX LSE FWB 
Number of 
IPOs 
16 23 3 3 4 2 
                                                   Table 4.1.1 
 
4.2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
As already mentioned, monthly raw returns are used for the purposes of the study, the 
formula for their calculation is: 
                                    Rst = (Pst – Pst-1) / Pst-1     (1) 
Where: 
Rst: The Rate of Return of the shipping company (s) in the month (t). 
Pst: The closing price of the shipping company (s) in the month (t). 
Pst-1: The closing price of the shipping company (s) in month (t-1). 
 
Expected Rate of Returns of the shipping companies on the benchmark, which is the 
market that the issuing took place, during the corresponding time period are calculated 
by the following formula: 
                           R
*
st = as + βs Rmt + εt               (2)  
Where: 
E(Rs) = Expected Rate of Return of the shipping company (s) in the month (t). 
as =  Measures the mean return on security (s) over the examined period. 
βs = The systematic risk of the shipping company (s). 
Rmt = The observed Return of the market (m) in the month (t). 
 
                                                             
2
 NYSE: New York Stock Exchange, OSE: Oslo Stock Exchange, SGX: Singapore Stock Exchange, LSE: 
London Stock Exchange, FWB: Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 
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According to Ritter (1991), Levis (1993), Syriopoulos et. al. (2007), Merikas et. al. 
(2009), for the calculation of the Abnormal Rate of Returns the following formula is 
used: 
                                     ARst = rst - rmt                                (3) 
Where: 
ARst = The Abnormal Rate of Return of the shipping company (s) in the month (t). 
rst = The Rate of Return of the shipping company (s) in the month (t). 
rmt = The Rate of Return of the market (m) in the month (t). 
 
The next step is to calculate the equally weighted arithmetic average of the market 
adjusted returns using the formula: 
                                    ARt = 1/n    
 
   st                  (4) 
Where: 
ARt = The equally weighted arithmetic average. 
n = The number of the shipping IPOs in the month (t). 
 
Finally, the Cumulative abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated in order to detect if 
there is overperformance or underperformance. Overperformance occurs when CAR 
has a positive value, while a negative value of CAR indicates underperformance. 
                                  CART = 1/n    
 
   t  (5) 
Where: 
CART = Cumulative Abnormal Return from month (t) to month (t+1). 
The calculation of the t-statistic is a necessary step in order to check the statistical 
significance of the abnormal performance. According to Brown and Warner (1985) 
and Ajlouni (2009), the first step is to calculate the Standardization of the average 
Abnormal Returns (SAR). 
                                     SARst = ARst / SDARt          (6) 
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Where: 
SARst = Standardization of the average Abnormal Return 
ARst = Abnormal Return 
SDARt = Standard Deviation 
 
Then the t-statistic is retrieved from the formula: 
                       t-statistic =         s,t / n                (7) 
 
4.2.2. Buy and Hold Abnormal return 
The Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) is the difference between the holding-
period returns of stock and the market return: 
 
 
BHARst =      
 
 * (1+rst)] –      
  * (1+rmt)]             (8) 
 
Where:  
rst = The Rate of Return of the shipping company (s) in the month (t). 
rmt = The Rate of Return of the market (m) in the month (t). 
 
The mean BHARst over the period T is: 
  
                          BHARst= 1/n      
 
   sT                    (9) 
 
 
4.2.3 Buy and Hold Returns and Wealth Relative 
Buy and Hold Return (BHR) is another measure of the long-run performance of IPOs, 
classified as the geometrically compounded return. Market and stock returns are 
calculated by using the same formula: 
                          BHRst =  
 
  1+rst) - 1               (10) 
Where: 
rst = The Rate of Return of the shipping company (s) in the month (t). 
t = The first month of the listing. 
T = The end of the time window period. 
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The difference between the BHRs of the stock and the BHRs of the market gives the 
Benchmark-Adjusted Buy and Hold Returns. According to Ajlouni (2009), when the 
value of BARst is higher than zero, the stock is over-performing the benchmark. 
Wealth Relative (WRsT) is defined as the stock's Buy-and-Hold Return over the 
benchmark's Buy-and-Hold Return, during a period of (T) months: 
 
                      WRsT = (1+BHRsT) / (1+BHRmT)        (11) 
 
Where: 
WRsT = The Wealth Relative of the shipping company (s) during the period (T). 
BHRst = The Buy-and-Hold Returns of the shipping company (s) during the period 
(T). 
BHRmT = The Buy-and-Hold Returns of the market (m) during the period (T).  
 
 
The individual wealth relatives are aggregated across the N stocks to calculate the 
aggregate WR, as:                         
 
                              WRT =    
 
   st                          (12) 
 
Where: 
WRT = The aggregated Wealth Relative during the period (T). 
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5. Short-Run and Long-Run Results 
5.1 Underpricing Regression Results  
 
                                                     Underpricing Tests 
Regression 
Models 
Intercept Gearing 
Level 
Gross 
Proceeds 
Size Equity 
Offered 
Age of 
Company  
Age of 
Fleet  
Market 
Reputation  
Underwriter 
Reputation  
R^2 
(A) -1.95 1.05 0.12 - 0.36 0.10 0.45 0.09 -0.2 0.158 
 (-1.37) (0.99) (0.74) - (0.67) (1.52) (1.54) (0.39) (-1.10)  
(B)  -4.18 0.79 - 0.43 0.12 0.06 0.30 0.09 -0.13 0.348 
  (-3.90) (0.85) - (3.30) (0.25) (1.01) (1.17) (0.46) (-0.78)   
                                                                        Table 5.1.1 
                             
When we run a regression analysis, it is very important to test if there is correlation 
between the variables in order to avoid multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is a 
phenomenon where two or more variables in a multiple regression are highly 
correlated and consequently the regression results are not reliable.  In order to check if 
the variables are correlated, it is necessary to construct a correlation matrix. The 
correlation matrix gives us information about the volume of correlation between the 
variables. We run the correlation matrix that includes both the dependent and 
independent variables. According to Gujarati (2004), two variables are highly 
correlated when the value is bigger than 0.8. The outcome is that two out of nine 
variables that are examined are highly correlated and gross proceeds and the size of 
the company are correlated at a 92.4% degree. Thus, if we want the results to be 
unbiased, we cannot use a regression model that includes both factors.  
We examine many regression models using different combinations of the independent 
variables and we conclude to the following models: 
A. Rp = a + b1[Log(GP)] + b2(EO) + b3[Log(1 + D/E)] + b4[log(1+ age01)] 
+b5[log(1+ age02)] +   + b6(RU) + b7(RSE) + εi and 
B. Rp = a + b1[log(SZ)] + b2(EO) + b3[Log(1 + D/E)] + b4[log(1+ age01)] + 
b5[log(1+ age02)] +  b6(RU) + b7(RSE) + εi   
Where Rp is the continuously compounded return of the first trading day, we calculate 
the returns using the first offering price and the first close price of the share. GP is the 
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gross proceeds, SZ is the size of the company, EO is the proportion of equity offered, 
D/E is the gearing level, age01 is the age of the company, age02 is the average age of 
the fleet, RU is the reputation of the underwriter, and RSE is the reputation of the 
Stock Exchange. 
It is essential to mention that many regression models with different combinations of 
the variables have been checked in order to end up with the two models above. The 
criterion for our choice is the R–squared. “R–squared gives information about how 
well the model containing the explanatory variables that was proposed, actually 
explain variations in the dependent variable” (Brooks, 2008). In the first regression 
model that we use, R-squared is 15.8% and 34.8% in the second, which actually 
means that the regression models that we use fit well on the data. In addition, 
Adjusted R-squared was taken into account in order to check if a variable should be 
included in the regression model or not. The null hypothesis of the regressions is that 
there is no relationship between the dependent and the independent variable. The 
31.74% of the shipping companies that are included in the sample are underpriced, 
this can be interpreted that the underpricing in the sample is of great magnitude. 
The gearing level is found to have a positive relationship with the underpricing at the 
first trading day, but P-value is too high and there is no evidence that there is a 
relationship between the gearing level and the underpricing, in contrast with 
Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) who concluded that gearing has explanatory power 
over cross sectional underpricing of the whole sample. 
The regression results reveal that the age of the fleet is positively related to the IPO 
underpricing of the first trading day. This means that when a company owns a more 
mature fleet, is more likely to become a subject of underpricing, than a company that 
owns a younger fleet. However, P-value is too high and the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, thus, there is not a statistically significant relationship between the two 
variables.  
 
The results that were retrieved from the regression between the continuously 
compounded returns of the first trading day and the age of the company didn’t 
generate any evidence that the two variables are related. This time there is a positive 
relationship between the variables, but it is not a statistically insignificant one.  
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The reputation of the underwriter is not statistically significant related to the 
underpricing, although there is a negative relationship between them. This can be 
interpreted that an IPO that has issued by an unreputable underwriter is more likely to 
exhibit underpricing in the first trading day, than an IPO that has been issued by a 
reputable underwriter. In their research, Merikas et. al. (2009) point out that their 
results “clearly show that all Shipping firms listed with non reputable underwriters 
experienced severe level of underpricing”. Many researches support the notion that 
the greatest the reputation of the underwriter, the less the underpricing for the share of 
the issuer. This means that when famous underwriters are related with the IPO 
procedure, the initial price represents in a better manner the issuer’s reliability 
(Beatty, Ritter, 1986; Carter, Manaster, 1990; Chemmanur, Fulgieri, 1994). 
The regression analysis between the continuously compounded returns of the first 
trading day and the reputation of the market indicates that there is no strong 
relationship between them. The coefficient of the regression has a positive sign. The 
information that is disclosed from this regression indicates that when a shipping 
company chooses to issue an IPO in a reputable market, it is more possible to 
experience underpricing in the first trading day, than a company that chooses to issue 
in an unreputable market.  
The proportion of equity offered and the IPO underpricing are not related in a 
statistically significant level. Consequently, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The coefficient of the regression reveals that there is a negative relationship. This 
means that a shipping company that issues a bigger proportion of equity is more 
possible to become the subject of a greater underpricing. While Grammenos et. al. 
(1996) found that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship for a 
reduced sample.  
 
The size of the company is found to be strongly and positively related to the 
underpricing at a 1% level of significance at. The result indicates that when a shipping 
company of a greater size enters the IPO market it is more likely to become subject 
for a greater underpricing during the first trading day. Ritter (1984), Chalk and Peavy 
(1990), Ritter (1991) and Ibbotson et. al. (1994) don’t concur with this outcome.  
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The regression results are similar to those of Grammenos et. al (1996) that show that 
there is a positive but not a strong relationship between the gross proceeds and the 
underpricing of the first trading day.  
5.2 Long-Run Performance 
 
CAR – BHAR – WEALTH RELATIVE 
Months 
No of firms 
trading 
CARs BHARs Wealth Relatives 
1 51 -0,060 -0,021 0,979 
2 51 -0,077 0,021 1,021 
3 51 -0,107 0,003 1,000 
4 51 -0,172 -0,027 0,969 
5 51 -0,231 -0,019 0,979 
6 51 -0,244 0,024 1,025 
7 51 -0,253 0,030 1,029 
8 51 -0,257 0,032 1,031 
9 51 -0,292 0,005 1,007 
10 51 -0,376 -0,054 0,947 
11 51 -0,324 0,089 1,091 
12 51 -0,361 0,000 1,001 
13 51 -0,401 -0,009 0,993 
14 51 -0,404 0,029 1,030 
15 51 -0,431 0,005 1,007 
16 51 -0,490 -0,013 0,986 
17 51 -0,488 0,044 1,043 
18 51 -0,548 -0,017 0,984 
19 51 -0,543 0,050 1,048 
20 51 -0,591 -0,009 0,992 
21 51 -0,637 -0,007 0,994 
22 51 -0,638 0,035 1,036 
23 51 -0,658 0,017 1,015 
24 51 -0,671 0,021 1,019 
25 42 -0,666 0,026 1,032 
26 42 -0,684 0,031 1,032 
27 42 -0,749 -0,021 0,980 
28 42 -0,775 0,007 1,004 
29 42 -0,848 -0,032 0,970 
30 42 -0,898 0,000 1,002 
31 42 -0,895 0,049 1,049 
32 42 -0,952 -0,015 0,986 
33 42 -0,992 0,004 1,003 
34 42 -1,011 0,013 1,011 
35 42 -1,013 0,060 1,088 
                                           Table 5.2.1 
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5.2.1 CAR Empirical Results 
Table 5.2.1 depicts Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs), Buy-and-Hold Returns 
(BHARs) and Wealth Relatives for the 3 year period after the shipping IPO issuing.  
For the 1 year and 2 years periods we examine 51 shipping companies, while for the 
three years period we examine 42 companies. Only 5 adjusted monthly average 
returns are positive and all the cumulative monthly average adjusted returns are 
negative. Due to the fact that it is unavoidable to lose an observation when Returns 
are estimated, the sample has 35 observations and there is no value for the 36th 
month. None of these average abnormal returns are statistically different from zero.  
After the three year period of secondary market trading, the CAR is -97.514%. The 
maximum negative abnormal return is observed in the 10th month (-8.42%), while the 
minimum negative abnormal return is observed is 0.10% in the 22nd month. The 
maximum positive return is 5.18% and occurs in the 11
th
 month while the minimum 
positive return is 0.18% and occurs in the 17th month. The results of the long-run 
performance using the Cumulative Abnormal Returns reveal that there is an 
underperformance during all the months. The figure 5.2.2 shows that there is a strong 
and steady decrease of CARs in the passage of time.    
        MONTHY CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
                                                           Figure 5.2.2 
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5.2.2 BHAR Empirical Results 
 
There are many previous studies which state that the examination of the long-run 
performance using CARs, may lead to false results because CARs are a biased 
predictor for long term (Lyon et. al., 1999; Ajluni, 2009). Thus, the long-run 
performance of shipping IPOs will be further analyzed by using the BHAR measure. 
Table 5.2.1 reveals that the mean BHARs are positive. Only 12 out of 35 months have 
a negative value of mean BHAR. Three years after the issuing, the mean BHAR is 
estimated 6.03%. Thus, the BHAR measure indicates that after a three year period 
there is an overperformance of about 6.03% for the sample that consists of 42 
shipping companies. Two years and one year after the issuing, the mean BHAR is 
estimated to be equal to 3.05% and 0.04%, respectively, for the sample that consists 
of 51 shipping companies. The results show that there is evidence of overperformance 
for all the periods under examination. As we can observe in Figure 5.2.3, there is high 
volatility in BHARs during all the months under examination. The lower value of the 
BHARs is observed during the 10
th
 month, while the higher is observed immediately 
after, in the 11
th
 month.  
 
The results of this study indicate that new shares of Shipping Companies, offer to 
investors positive returns if they buy stocks during the offering period or at the end of 
the first trading day. Consequently, according to buy and hold strategy, investors that 
buy IPOs of Maritime firms at the offering period and they hold them for one, two or 
three year period, obtain positive returns because the offer price is lower than the 
price of those time windows. However, according to BHAR measure, the most 
beneficial investment to make in the shipping industry is to buy stocks during the 10
th
 
month and sell during the 11
th
 month, simultaneously, for someone who bought a 
shipping IPO it is also beneficial to sell during the 11
th
 month. 
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                  MONTHLY BUY-AND-HOLD ABNORMAL RETURNS  
 
                                                                          Figure 5.2.3 
 
5.2.3 Wealth Relative Empirical Results 
 
The Wealth Relative Benchmark is 1. When the wealth relative is higher than 1, the 
IPOs overperform the Market Benchmark. On the other hand, when the Wealth 
Relative is below 1, the IPOs underperform the Market Benchmark. As shown in 
Table 5.2.1, there are 12 out of the 35 observations with a value lower than 1. Thus, 
Wealth Relative measure reveals that there is IPO underperformance in 12 months. It 
is obvious, that during the remaining months there is IPO overperformance. When 
there is a comparison of the results between the BHAR measure and Wealth Relative, 
it is clear that both measures show overperformance in the same months, which is 
reasonable if we take under consideration the methodology used in order to calculate 
the Wealth Relatives. In the 12, 24 and 35 months time periods, both measures reveal 
an overperformance. The Figure 5.2.4 shows that there is high volatility of the Wealth 
Relatives during all the months under examination. Additionally, we can observe that 
there is a great similarity among the two Figures 5.2.3 and 5.2.4. Wealth Relative 
measure also reveals higher performance on the 11
th
 month and lower performance on 
the 10
th
 month.   
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 MONTHLY WEALTH RELATIVES 
 
                                                                 Figure 5.2.4 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Long-run Performance Regression Results 
 
In order to determine the relationship between the long-run performance and the 
independent variables, we run a cross-sectional regression using as a dependent 
variable the BHARs. The regression model that is used is: 
BHAR = a + b1(GP) + b2[log(SZ)] + b3(EO) + b4(D/A) + b5[log(1+age01)] +    
+b6[log(1+age02)] + b7(RU) + b8(RSE) + b9(IU) + εi   
The null hypothesis of the regressions is that there is no relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variable. Once again a correlation matrix has to be 
created, in order to avoid multicollinearity. Gross proceeds and size are found to be 
highly correlated, at a degree of about 95.9% and for this purpose two new regression 
models are constructed: 
A. BHAR = a + b1[Log(GP)] + b2(EO) + b3[Log(1 + D/E)] + b4[log(1+ age01)] + 
+b5[log(1+ age02)] +  b6(RU) + b7(RSE) + b8(IU) + εi and 
B. BHAR = a + b1[log(SZ)] + b2(EO) + b3[Log(1 + D/E)] + b4[log(1+ age01)] +    
+ b5[log(1+ age02)] +  b6(RU) + b7(RSE) + b8(IU) + εi   
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                          LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE TESTS 
Regression 
Models 
Intercept Gearing 
Level 
Gross 
Proceeds 
Size Equity 
Offered 
Age of 
Company  
Age of 
Fleet  
Market 
Reputation  
Underwriter 
Reputation  
Initial 
Underpricing 
R^2 
(A) -0.149 -0.005 0.013 - 0.078 -0.003 0.024 -0.017 0.008 0.007 0.33 
 (-1.764) (-0.073) (1.51) - (1.835) (-0.787) (1.04) (-0.856) (0.693) (0.611)  
(B)  -0.129 -0.012 - 0.012 0.076 -0.004 0.02 -0.018 0.011 0.005 0.33 
  (-1.747) (-0.170) - (1.51) (1.785) (-0.897) (0.891) (-0.932) (0.851) (0.416)   
                                                                 Table 5.3.1 
                            
                              The regression models are constructed by this way in order to avoid having the two 
variables that are correlated in the same model; both models have R-squared 33%. 
The only factor that was found to have a statistically significant explanatory power is 
the proportion of equity offered. This variable found to be positively related to the 
long-run performance at a level of significance of 10%. This can be interpreted as the 
higher the proportion of the equity that a company offers at the initial offering, the 
higher the long-run performance will be. If we further analyze this finding, it is 
essential to highlight that a possible reason for a shipping stock to be underperformed 
in the long-run, is the low proportion of equity offered at the initial offering. 
The variables initial underpricing, age of fleet, reputation of the underwriter, size and 
gross proceeds are not found to be statistically significant explanatory factors. 
However, they are positively related to BHARs and it would be useful to understand 
what this indicates. The existence of underpricing, the higher the gross proceeds of the 
shipping IPO, the older the fleet of the company, the greater the reputation of the 
underwriter and the size of the company will result in a better long-run performance. 
Gajeski and Gresse (2006) that examined the relationship between long-term 
performance of the IPOs and the reputation of the underwriter concluded that this is a 
positive relationship. Levis (1993) points out that there is a negative relationship 
between issue size and long-run performance. Very interesting is the relation that is 
revealed between the initial underpricing and the long-run performance of the 
shipping IPOs. The results indicate that the existence of underpricing on the first 
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trading day is possible to influence positively the long-run performance of the 
shipping IPO. 
 
The factors gearing level, age of the company and reputation of the market are also 
not found to have statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. 
These factors though, are negatively related to BHARs. These results can be 
interpreted in favor of the shipping companies that have the issuance of an IPO in 
their immediate plans. The higher the gearing level, the longer the history of the 
company before the issuing and the greater the reputation of the market that the 
issuance took place in, will possibly result in the shipping IPO underperforming in the 
long-run.  The findings of Merikas et. al. (2009) indicate that the effects of age in the 
long term performance is a significant factor in the three year period whether we 
study from the end of the first day of trading or from the end of the first month and 
this shows that firms with long history before going public, perform better in the long 
term. According to research conducted by Merikas et. al. (2009) the result about the 
market reputation remains statistically insignificant once they look the returns in one, 
two and three years from the end of the first day of trading, though, there is a light of 
significance when their study starts from the end of first month of trading and focus in 
one and three years return.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper presents fresh evidence for short-run and long-run performance of Initial 
Public Offerings that were issued from shipping companies during the period 1997-
2010. The main contribution of this paper is to update the previous literature by using 
recent data with the intention of drawing some conclusions. 
 
The study of the short-run performance was conducted using a sample of 63 IPOs that 
were issued by shipping firms in 10 different Stock Exchanges. According to the 
sample, most shipping companies use either dry bulk carriers or tankers. U.S 
companies present the highest average of gross proceeds, while 2006 was the year that 
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shipping companies with the highest level of gross proceeds and gearing were 
entering the IPO market. In 2007, shipping companies that issued IPOs were having 
the largest market size among all the other years under examination. Shipping firms 
started to offer a bigger proportion of equity at the issuing in 2008 and this proportion 
continues to rise until today.   
Underpricing in the sample is of great magnitude (31.74%). In order to detect the 
factors that may affect the underpricing on the sample, were have chosen eight 
factors, some of which were quantitative and others were qualitative.  Size was the 
only factor found to have positive statistically significant explanatory power over the 
underpricing of the global shipping IPO sample. Gearing level, age of fleet, age of 
company, reputation of the market and gross proceeds are also found to be positively 
related to short-run performance but not to a statistically significant degree. The 
reputation of the market and the proportion of equity offered at the issuing, found to 
be factors that are negatively related to the short-run performance but not statistically 
significant, either.  
Another aspect this thesis critically examines is the analysis of the long-run 
performance of the shipping IPOs. For this purpose a reduced sample has been used 
due to the fact that the initial sample consisted of shipping IPOs that were issued 
during the period 1997-2010 and the new sample contained shipping IPOs that were 
issued during the period 1997-2008. Three time periods were examined; the sample 
that was used for the 3year and 2year time periods consisted of 51 shipping IPOs, 
while the sample that was used for the 1year time period contained 42 new listings.  
Three different measures were employed to examine the long-run performance, 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns and Wealth 
Relatives. CARs showed that there was underperformance for every month under 
examination. Although CARs is a commonly used measure, according to previous 
literature it generates biased results when used in long-run. BHARs and Wealth 
Relatives indicated that there is an overperformance in all three time periods 
examined. When an investor buys shipping IPOs, it is on his/her own benefit to sell 
the investment after eleven months, because at that month the highest 
overperformance is presented. On the other hand, the shipping IPOs are 
underperformed for 12 out of the 35 months and there is evidence that it is very likely 
for a shipping IPO to underperform during the first five months of listing. 
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At the last part of this thesis, we determine the relationship between some factors and 
the long-run performance and the effect that these may have on underperformance. 
BHARs are used as dependent variable, while the independent variables are the same 
that were used to detect the underpricing. One extra factor that is used is the relevance 
of the initial underpricing. The only factor found to have positive statistically 
significant explanatory power over the long-run performance is the proportion of 
equity offered. This means that when a shipping firm offers bigger proportion of 
equity at the issuing, it is less likely for the shipping IPO to underperform in the long-
run. Gearing level, age of the company and reputation of the market found to be 
negatively related to the long-run performance. While, age of fleet, reputation of the 
underwriter, size and gross proceeds were found to be positively related to the long-
run performance. Although, there is no evidence that the initial underpricing is related 
to the long-run performance of the shipping IPOs in a statistically significant level, it 
was found to be positively related, which can be interpreted that the existance of 
underpricing at the first listing day is possible to influence positively the long-run 
performance of shipping IPOs.  
Potential future researchers can analyze the subject in greater extent by using a larger 
sample that will be divided into subgroups. Each subgroup will be represented by a 
Stock Exchange. This way it will enable a further investigation about the relation 
between the shipping IPO performance and the issuing market. Another aspect of the 
subject is to study the long-run performance of each IPO individually. Although, it 
could be a lengthy process, it would facilitate the researcher to analyze shipping IPOs 
in great depth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
7. References 
 Aggarwal, R., and P. Rivoli (1990) Evaluating the costs of raising capital 
through an initial public offering. Journal of Business Venturing. 
 
 Ajlouni and Albazie (2009) Long-run performance of Initial Public Offerings in 
an emerging market: The case of Amman Stock Exchange. Journal of 
International Finance and Economics.  
 
 Alan O. Sykes, An introduction to regression analysis. 
 
 Barber B, Lyon J (1997) Detecting abnormal operating performance: the 
empirical power and specification of test statistics. J Finance Econ, 43:pp.341–
372. 
 
 Baron, D P (1982) A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising 
and Distribution Services for New Issues. Journal of Finance, Vol 37, No 4, pp 
955–976. 
 
 Beatty, R, and J Ritter (1986) Investment Banking Reputation, and the 
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 
15, No 1/2, pp 213–232. 
 
 Benveniste, L. and P. Spindt (1989) How Investment Bankers Determine the 
Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues. Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 
343–61. 
 
 Block, S. and Stanley, M. (1980) The Financial Characteristics and Price 
Movement Patterns of Companies Approaching the Unseasoned Securities 
Market in the Late 1970s’. Financial Management, pp. 30-36. 
 
43 
 Brau, J. C., and S.E. Fawcett (2006) Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of 
Theory and Practice. Journal of Finance, 61, pp.399-436. 
 Brau, J., B. Francis, and N. Kohers (2003) The choice of IPO versus takeover: 
Empirical evidence. Journal of Business 76, pp.583-612. 
 
 Brown, J. M. (1970) Post –Offering Experience of Companies Going Public. 
Journal of Business, pp. 10-18. 
 
 Brown, S. J., and Warner, J.B. (1985) Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of 
Event. Studies, Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 14, pp. 3-31. 
 
 Cai, J. and Wei, J. (1997) The Investment and Operating IPO Performance of 
Japanese IPO firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 5, pp.389-417.  
 
 Carter, R, and S Manaster (1990) Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter 
Reputation. Journal of Finance, Vol 45, No 4, pp 1045–1067. 
 
 Chalk, A., and J. Peavy (1987) Initial Public Offerings: Daily returns, offerings 
types and the price effect. Financial Analysis Journal, pp.65-69. 
 
 Chemmanur, T, and P Fulghieri (1994) Investment Bank Reputation, 
Information Production, and Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance, Vol 
49, No 1, pp. 57–79. 
 
 Chemmanur, T. J., and P. Fulghieri (1999) A theory of the going-public 
decision. Review of Financial Studies 12, pp.249-279. 
 
 Chris Brooks (2008) Introductory Econometrics for Finance, pp. 106-107, UK, 
Cambridge. 
 
 Costas Th. Grammenos (2002) The Handbook of Maritime Economics and 
Business pages (pp.170-173, Dry bulk carriers), pp. 251,Cornwall, MPG Books 
 
44 
Ltd. 
 Daily, C.M., Certo, T., Dalton, D.R., & Roengpitya, R. (2003) IPO 
underpricing: A meta-analysis and research synthesis. Entrepreneurship Theory 
Practice, 27, pp.271–295. 
  Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber (1967) The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 49, pp. 92-107. 
 
  Drobetz, Wolfgang; Kammermann, Matthias; Wälchli, Urs (2005) Long-run 
performance of Initial Public Offerings: the evidence for Switzerland, 
Schmalenbach Business Review (SBR), pp. 253-275.  
 
 Fama E, French K (1993) Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and 
bonds. J Financ Econ 33:pp.3–56. 
 
 Filatotchev, I. and Bishop, K. (2002) Board composition, share ownership, and 
underpricing of U.K. IPO firms. Strategic Management Journal, 23: pp.941–55. 
 
 Gajewski, J. F., and C. Gresse (2006) A Survey of the European IPO Market. 
ECMI Paper. 
 
 Gompers and Lerner (2001) The really long-run performance of initial public 
offerings: The pre-Nasdaq evidence. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
working paper 8505. 
 
 Grammenos, C., and S. Marcoulis (1996) A cross-section analysis of stock 
returns: The case of shipping firms. Maritime Policy & Management 23, pp.67-
80. 
 
 Gujarati, D. (2004) Basic econometrics. 4th Edition, The McGraw−Hill 
Companies. 
 
 
45 
  Heng (Hunter) An, Kam C. Chan (2008) Credit ratings and IPO 
pricing Original Research Article. Journal of Corporate Finance, Volume 14,  
pp. 584-595. 
 
 Ibbotson, R., J. Sindelar, and J. Ritter (1994) The Market's problem with the 
pricing of Initial Public Offerings in Denmark. Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance 7, pp.66-74. 
 
 Ibbotson, R.J., Sindelar, J., & Ritter, J. (1988) Initial public offerings. Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance. 1, pp. 37–45. 
 
 Jaskiewicz, González, Menéndez, Schiereck (2005) Long-Run IPO 
Performance Analysis of German and Spanish Family-Owned Businesses. pp. 
179-202. 
 
 Jason Draho (2004) The IPO Decision-Why and How Companies Go public. 
pp.10, pp.37-38, pp.158-161, Norfolk, Biddles Ltd. 
 
 Kothari S, Warner J (1997) Measuring long-horizon security price performance. 
J Financ Econ 43: pp.301–339. 
 
 Kraus and Burghof (2003) Post-IPO Performance and the Exit of Venture 
Capitalists. 
 
 Levis, M. (1993) The Long-run Performance of IPOs: The UK Experience 
1980-1988. Financial Management 22, pp. 28-41. 
 
 Ljungqvist, A. P. and Wilhelm, W. J. (2003) IPO Pricing In The dot-com 
bubble. Journal of Finance, 58, pp.723–52. 
 
 Loughran T, Ritter JR (2000) Uniformly least powerful tests of market 
efficiency. J Financ Econ 55:pp.361–389. 
 
 
46 
 Loughran, T. and Ritter J.R. (1995) The new issues puzzle. Journal of Finance 
50(1), pp. 23-50. 
 
 Lyon, J. D.; Barber, B. M. and Tasi, Chih-Ling (1999) Improved Methods for 
Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns. Journal of Finance, pp.165-201. 
 
 Maksimovic, V., and P. Pichler (2001) Technological innovation and initial 
public offerings. Review of Financial Studies 14, pp.459-494. 
 
 Mello, A. S. and J. E. Parsons (2000) Hedging and liquidity. Review of 
Financial Studies 13, pp.127-153. 
 
 Merikas, Gounopoulos and Nounis (2009) Global Shipping IPOs performance. 
Maritime Policy & Management, pp.481-505. 
 
 Modigliani, Franco and Merton Miller (1963) The Corporate Income Taxes and 
the Cost of Capital: A Correction. American Economic Review, 53(3): pp. 433-
443. 
 
 Moore, C. B.; Bell, R. G.; Filatotchev (2010) Institutions and Foreign IPO 
Firms: The Effects of 'Home' and 'Host' Country Institutions on Performance. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, pp.469-490. 
 
 Neuberger, B. M. and LaChapelle, C.A. (1983) Unseasoned New Issue price 
performance on Three Tiers: 1975 1980. Financial Management, pp. 23-28. 
 
 Nitish Ranjan (2004) IPO Underpricing, Issue Mechanisms, and Size. 
 
 Reilley, F. K. and Hatfield (1969) Investor experience with New Stock Issues. 
Financial Analysts Journal, pp. 73-80. 
 
 Ritter, J. (1984) The hot issue market of 1980. The Journal of Business 57, 
pp.215-240. 
 
47 
 
 Ritter, J. (1991) The long performance of Initial Public Offerings. Journal of 
Finance 46, pp.3-28.  
 
 Ritter, J. and I. Welch (2002) A review of IPO activity, pricing and allocations. 
Journal of Finance 57: pp.795–828. 
 
 Rock, K. (1986) Why New Issues are Underpriced. Journal of Financial 
Economics, pp. 187–212. 
 
 Scott, H. James (1976) A Theory of Optimal Capital Structure. The Bell Journal 
of Economics, pp. 33-54. 
 
 Shiller, R.J. (1990) Speculative prices and popular models. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 4(2), pp.55-65. 
 
 Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch and T.J Wong (1998) Earnings Management and 
the Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings. The journal of 
finance, vol. LIII, No. 6. 
 
 Stoll, H. R. and Curley, A. J. (1970) Small Business and the New Issue Market 
for Equities. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp. 309-322. 
 
  Stoughton, N, and J Zechner (1998) IPO-Mechanisms, Monitoring and 
Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 45–77. 
 Sudip Ranjan Basu (2004) Economic Growth, Well-Being and Governance 
under Economic Reforms: Evidence from Indian States, HEI Working Papers.  
 
48 
  Syriopoulos T. and Theotokas I. (2007) Value creation through corporate 
destruction? Corporate governance in shipping takeovers. Maritime Policy & 
Management: An International Journal of Shipping and Port Research, 34:3, 
pp.225 – 242. 
 
 Syriopoulos Theodore C.  (2007) Financing Greek Shipping: Modern 
Instruments, Methods and Markets. 
 
 Teoh, Siew Hong & Welch, Ivo & Wong, T. J. (1998) Earnings management 
and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings1. Journal of Financial 
Economics, pp. 63-99. 
 
 Zingales, L. (1995) Insider ownership and the decision to go public. Review of 
Economic Studies 60, pp.425-448. 
 
 
                                                                              
